This research makes two contributions: (i) to price analytically put option and extension premium embedded in a borrower-extendible commitment, and (ii) to compute the 'fair' capital charge that corresponds to the commitment 'true' credit risk. In doing so, the procedure replaces the BIS accounting-based concepts of credit-conversion factor, principal-risk factor, and the distinction between revocable and irrevocable commitments with the market-based concepts of exercise-cum-takedown proportion and put value implicit in the borrower-extendible commitment, respectively. Finally, the approach is developed one step further to account for the borrowers' risk ratings by public credit agencies; this results in a two-dimensional (time-state of nature) risk-weighting system that applies to all commitment types.
CAPITAL CHARGE FOR LOAN COMMITMENT 'TRUE'
CREDIT RISK
-INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
According to the Bank for International Settlement (the BIS), the computation of the capital charge corresponding to the credit risk of off-balance-sheet credit commitments is twodimensional. Regarding the risk dimension, credit risk per se is apprehended by the creditconversion factor (0% or 50%) and the principal-risk factor (0% or 100%), respectively. On the time dimension, commitment duration is captured by only two initial term to maturity for irrevocable commitments (namely those with an initial term to maturity up to one year or longer than one year). Not unexpectedly, the BIS accounting-based procedure yields a very coarse grid of credit-risk weights for off-balance-sheet loan commitments. There are only two somewhat artificial values for both credit-conversion factor and principal-risk factor; and the capital charge corresponding to the credit risk of longer-term irrevocable commitments is very substantial, while that for short-term irrevocable commitments, as well as all revocable commitments irrespective of their initial term to maturity, is nil.
To link more directly the commitment "true" credit risk to its "fair" capital charge, this research proposes to substitute three market-based concepts to the BIS accounting-based coefficients. To start with, all commitments are construed as borrower-extendible commitments and differentiated on the basis of the length of their extension period (this is to replace the distinction between revocable and irrevocable commitments, with the latter ones being further split on the basis of the initial term to maturity). Next, the credit-conversion factor makes way for an empirically relevant exercise-cum-takedown proportion, namely the average amount of the credit line drawn down when the line is exercised. And finally, the principal-risk factor is replaced by the value of the put option embedded in borrower-extendible credit commitments.
Valuing this implicit credit-risk derivative then raises three questions: 1) Does the put option embedded in an extendible commitment captures credit risk irrespective of the commitment initial term to maturity? 2) Realistically, does line funding vary with the length of the commitment extension period? And 3) how is the "fair" capital charge for commitment credit risk computed?
According to Thakor et al. (1981) , when the interest rate on a commitment contract is lower than that on an equivalent spot loan, the borrower receives the credit-line face value but is only indebted for its lower marked-to-market value --henceforth referred to as the indebtedness value. More concretely, the borrower' s claim on the lending bank constitutes an embedded, yet valuable, commitment put option. It is thus sensible to determine the impact of this implicit liability on the bank's regulatory capital at the BIS audit date. The aggregate face value of still unused commitments is reported as an off-balance-sheet entry to the bank annual consolidated balance sheet. Yet, at the BIS annual audit date, the time remaining to commitment expiry is less than the initial term of many still-unused commitments. To account for this, the average time remaining to the commitment first expiry date, T 1 , has been standardized at T 1 -s, with s = 0 denoting the date at which the BIS capital-adequacy audit takes place. Within this time frame, the commitment put option is European and its value captures the bank' s notional liability for carrying the commitment at the audit date. In this research, we examine the most prevalent type of loan commitments, those with a floating prime-rate 2 formula devised as "fixed markup over a stochastic index cost of funds".
In recent years, Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Ergungor (2001) or Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) among others have stressed the central role played by commitments in bank lending, and several researchers have derived alternative formulas for valuing credit-line commitments. Thakor et al. (1981) , and Ho and Saunders (1983) derived option-like values for fixed-rate straight commitments, Thakor (1982) and Chateau (1990) obtained put formulas for non-extendible variable-rate commitments, and Hawkins (1982) priced revolving credit lines. To the best of our knowledge, extendible or rollover commitments, namely those in which the initial commitment period is extended for another time period, have not yet been priced. Within the BIS regulatory framework, pricing borrower-extendible commitments has the advantage to circumvent the artificial dichotomy between irrevocable commitments with a one-year initial term to maturity and those with an initial term to maturity longer than one year. Fortunately, there have been advances in research on derivatives with extendible maturities: Anathanarayanan and Schwartz (1980) have priced extendible bonds, Longstaff (1990) European options with extendible maturities, and Hauser and Lauterbach (1996) extendible warrants. Here the value of the extension premium results from a 2 According to Duca and Vanhoose (1990) or a more recent Federal Reserve survey (2000), about eighty percent of U.S. commercial and industrial lending is done via loan commitments, with the vast majority being of the floating-rate type. Typically, commitments with an upfront fee only are sold to high-credit-quality firms. But longer-term commitments with upfront and rearend fees are sold to medium size firms whose credit quality is poorer (see Berger and Udell [1995] and Petersen and Rajan [1994] ). This most prevalent type is examined here.
risk-neutral argument. Although our closed-form solution differs from Longstaff's arbitrage-based formula for the extendible put option (Longstaff 1990, eq. 12) , both approaches yield the same computed put values. Granted this short literature review, the research sets out: (i) to value the European commitment put implicit in borrower-extendible commitments; (ii) to determine in simulation experiments the magnitude of single-or multiple-year extension premiums comprised in the extendible put values; (iii) to use the simulated values to compute the fair capital charge corresponding to the commitment true credit risk; and (iv) to propose a new two-dimensional riskweighting system for extendible and non-extendible commitments alike. All this is worked out for commitment puts generated by the fixed markup of credit lines with a floating prime-rate formula.
Here is a summary of the paper. In Section 2, the 'true' credit risk of a commitment contract is shown to be the put option embedded in an extendible commitment in which the borrower can postpone the initial maturity upon paying an extension fee. We use risk-neutrality to value the extension premium comprised in the borrower-extendible commitment put option. A special case nested in the model is also priced, namely Thakor's (1982) put option embedded in a one-year straight commitment. An exercise-cum-takedown proportion is defined next: it combines an exercise-indicator function that captures the line exercise decision to a takedown or funding proportion that increases with the length of the extension period. As commitment puts are but notional values of embedded credit-risk derivatives, simulations are used in Section 3 to validate the robustness of the extendible-commitment model. Two patterns emerge from the simulations.
Put values implicit in loan commitments correspond to the notional liability incurred by the bank for carrying unused credit lines at the BIS audit date. In addition put values, and hence the bank's credit-risk costs, are more sensitive to variations in the length of the extension period than to changes in the indebtedness value.
Based on these simulations, the regulatory implications of extendible commitments are presented in Sections 4 and 5. To do this, the proposed procedure does away with the BIS creditconversion factor, principal-risk factor, and distinction between revocable and irrevocable commitments --the latter ones being further split on the basis of only two initial terms to maturity. These parameters are replaced with the exercise-cum-takedown proportion and the put value implicit in borrower-extendible commitment contracts; when combined together, these then directly link commitment credit risk to its market-based or 'fair' capital charge. Empirically, this implies that risk-weighted balances of all types of commitments are positive, and so do attract a capital charge. The procedure summarized in a first proposition also has two additional advantages: (i) put values constitute a finer credit-risk grid than the two artificial values of the BIS principal-risk factor, and (ii) capital charges computed from extendible-commitment balances are moderate and internally consistent for all commitment types. In Section V finally, the procedure goes one step further in accounting for the borrowers' credit-risk ratings. This yields a matrix of new standard credit-risk weights sensitive to three parameters: the borrowers' risk ratings of public credit agencies, the duration of the extension period, and the proportion of line funding, respectively. Interestingly, the credit-risk weights, which represent the bank's notional credit-risk costs per $100 of line commitment, are more sensitive to the extension duration-cumfunding proportion than to the borrowers' credit-rating range. Here again the procedure of computing the credit-risk weights is summarized in a (second) proposition.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the analytical value of the European put embedded in extendible and non-extendible commitments; it also determines the exercise-cum-takedown proportion. Simulation results are presented in Section 3 and used in Sections 4 and 5 to quantify the link between commitment credit risk and bank's capital charge.
Short concluding remarks close the paper in Section 6.
-VALUATION OF EXTENDIBLE CREDIT COMMITMENTS

-The borrower-extendible commitment
The salient features of a (no-default) commitment with a fixed markup are stylized in the decision chart below. In part (a) of the chart, the bank writes at date 0 an off-balance-sheet commitment contract for a credit line (CL) with the following features: (i) the initial one-year It now remains to explain why the put embedded in a borrower-extendible commitment is considered as a European option within the BIS regulatory time frame. The aggregate value of all unused commitments is reported as an off-balance sheet entry to the bank' s annual consolidated statement. Yet, at the annual reporting date s, the time remaining to the extension date T 1 is less than the initial one-year period for many of the outstanding rollover commitments. So, in part (b) of the chart, the average time remaining to the extension date (T 1 -s) has been standardized at 6 months, with s=0 denoting the valuation (= audit) date (see also Merton [1977] for a similar argument). Two outcomes are possible at date T 2 for a commitment that has been extended at time T 1 . It is either exercised and partial or total funding of the initial $100, 0 ≤ π i ≤ 1, results in an outstanding corporate loan --it is explained in subsection 2.4 how the exercise-cum-takedown proportion π i is arrived at. Or, alternatively, the commitment simply expires and the borrower 7 The borrower's ambiguously defined financial condition prevents us from defining a clear lower bound to the marked-to-market value of the credit line. Had such an explicit lower bound (or barrier) been defined, the commitment would have automatically vanished for unsound borrowers --a sort of down-and-out put option. 8 Borrower self-selection as a screening and risk-sharing device with optimal fee mix is also examined in Fery et al. (2003) , Shockley and Thakor (1997) , Thakor (1989) , and reviewed in Ergungor (2001) or Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) . 9 According to Shockley and Thakor (1997, basis points, ±50 basis points, and so on) for non-prime commitments 11 , and (iii) higher markups or credit spreads of non-prime commitments are associated with lower risk ratings of external credit agencies (more on this in Section 5). We now examine a particular case nested in the borrower-extendible commitment.
Nested case
The one-year non-extendible commitment is a special case nested in the extendiblecommitment model. In that case and always within the BIS time frame, the borrower draws on the line at date T 1 , with the one-year corporate loan, [T 1 , T * ], becoming outstanding immediately. It ensues that the middle section of part (a) of the decision chart (relating to the extension fee and extension period) is omitted and part (b) of the chart is adjusted accordingly. Thakor (1982) was the first to price the components "split fees + commitment put" of non-extendible floating-rate
commitments. Yet, the emergence of a one-year straight commitment does not prevent the borrower from writing subsequently a new commitment contract.
-Indebtedness value and its risk-neutral stochastic process
Thakor et al. (1981) were the first to define the marked-to-market value of a credit line, an economic value usually referred to as the borrower's debt or indebtedness value, X. These indebtedness values, at date T 1 for a one-year straight commitment and date T 2 for a borrowerextendible commitment, are computed respectively as
where L 1 = L 2 is the line par value, (T 1 -T*) = (T 2 -T*) is loan duration once the commitment has 10 According to Fery et al. (2003, Table 1) , the mean maturity of loans over the period January 1983 to December 1999 is 4.13 years for published credit lines and 4.06 years for non-published ones, respectively. This observation corroborates previous results obtained by Shockley and Thakor (1997) . It thus makes sense to model one-year commitments with extensions up to four or even five years. 11 As for the magnitude of such spreads over the floating prime rate, consult Angbazo et al. (1998) , Elsas and Krahnen (1998) or Shockley and Thakor (1997) . , namely when the fixed markup is less than the stochastic spot markup computed from primary credit and funding rates. For instance, when our illustrative 1.5-% forward markup is combined with, say, a 2.5% spot markup, the markup differential in eq.
(1) is negative at -1%. It follows that the inequality
gives rise to an implicit commitment put option as the borrower's debt value is less than the option strike price 13 . We assume that the law of motion of the indebtedness value X is
where in eq. (2) the constant terms µ and σ are the instantaneous drift and instantaneous standard deviation of the indebtedness-value lognormal distribution, and dz X (t) the differential of the Wiener process z X (t). The switch from the real world in eq. (2) to the risk-neutral world in eq. (2') is accomplished by a change of probability measure. In the latter expression r is the constant instantaneous riskless rate of interest, µ = r -.5σ 2 , and the starred differential denotes the riskadjusted version of the original Wiener process.
-Valuing the European put embedded in extendible and non-extendible commitments
We now price in turn the European put option implicit in one-year straight commitments and commitments with single-or multiple-year extension periods.
12 Any banking decision taken at the margin considers the upfront fee as a fixed, and thus sunk, cost. To maintain here the neutrality of the trade-off between spot loan and credit under a commitment, we assume that the usage fee due at exercise date T 1 ,
, that the borrower will pay for a spot loan at the same date. Otherwise, the markup differential (
) with eq. (1) adjusted accordingly. The same adjustment holds true for date T 2 . The alternative approach is the all-in-cost basis, in which markup + fees are computed and compared for credit commitments and spot loans. 13 More specifically, the subsidy received by the borrower at exercise date is with respect to the markup of the class of floating prime-rate borrowers, and not to some sort of cost index or interest rate.
-Pricing the put embedded in one-year straight commitments
The value of the put option embedded in a one-year commitment, labelled P0 since nonextendible, is isomorphic to the value of the Black-Scholes (1973) European put option. Namely
where
and N(d±) is the cumulative probability at d± of the standard normal density, the other terms having been defined previously. In eq. (3), the value of the implicit commitment put depends on the indebtedness value X, the credit-line par (= exercise) value L 1 , and the maturity date T 1 .
-Pricing the borrower-extendible commitment put
We denote the value of the European commitment put embedded in borrower-extendible
; it depends on the indebtedness value at date T 1 , 1 T X , the credit-line exercise value L 1 = L 2 , the maturity dates T 1 and T 2 , and the date-T 1 extension fee,
. Postscript i to EP refers to the length of the extension period, T 2 -T 1 , with i: 1, 2, …,5 years.
For instance, EP1(∴) refers to the one-year extension period of a two-year commitment contract.
The value of the extension privilege is thus defined as:
where the second term is priced in eq. (3). We now call upon a risk-neutral argument to value the extension privilege. This premium is the expected value of the extension privilege at time T 1 in a risk-neutral world, discounted to the valuation time s=0 at the risk-free rate of interest, r. Namely Clearly, the extension privilege is valuable only when I 1 < 1 T X < I 2 . The interval lower and upper bounds, I 1 and I 2 , can be found by solving the following maturity conditions:
Once I 1 and I 2 have been found, the final payoff of the extension privilege is written:
where 1 condition is equal to one if the condition is verified and zero otherwise. Following some tedious but straightforward developments collected in the Appendix, the closed-form expression for the value of the extension premium is 14 :
where the terms x, x*, z 1 , z 2 and ρ are defined as follows: 14 Using a standard arbitrage argument, Longstaff previously derived a different expression for the European put option with an extendible maturity (Longstaff 1990 , eq.12, p.943). Although our risk-neutral closed-form solution differs from that of Longstaff, both approaches yield the same computed extendible-put values.
is the cumulative probability of the standard normal density and N 2 (∴, ∴, -ρ) is the cumulative probability of the standard bivariate normal density with correlation -ρ. Note that the extension-premium value comprises both the extension fee,
, and the value of the one-year straight commitment put, P0. So, if the latter is added to the extension-premium value (namely eq.
(3) plus eq. (8)), we verify that:
or the borrower-extendible put value = the one-year put value + the value of the single-or-multiple-year extension premium.
-Modelling the line-funding proportion
Once the embedded put value is computed, it remains to determine the proportion of the credit line taken down. This is done in two steps. To start with, commitment exercise is captured by an exercise-indicator function that is equal to one if exercise occurs and zero otherwise; namely I i = 1{X i < L}, where i: 0, ..., 5 denotes the length of the extension period --from zero year for straight commitments to five years for six-year commitments with a five-year extension period. Once the commitment with a given extension period is exercised, the exercise indicator is combined with a drawdown parameter, 0 ≤ d i ≤1, that captures the amount of the credit line actually taken down. This combination defines the line-funding proportion of a commitment with an ith extension period. That is
where E is the mathematical expectation and d i the takedown parameter, with i: 0, ..., 5 denoting the length of the extension period. When there is full takedown, d i = 1; in the absence of exercise and thus commitment takedown, the complementary proportion is (1 -
In the BIS regulatory context, the proportion π i applies at the bank's level 15 to the aggregate amount of commitments within each maturity class or extension period, namely to the dollar total of each class of commitments at the audit date. In addition, from the empirical evidence reported in Morgan (1993) 16 and later on in panel B of Table 2 for a large international bank, we select a proportion π i , that remains constant within each extension period but increases with the duration of the extension period. To wit, a proportion of π 0 = 50% means that 50% of the aggregate contractual value of all commitments with an initial maturity less than one year is taken down;
this proportion increases to π 5 = 75% for commitments with at least a five-year extension period.
The percentage chosen for straight commitments or those with short extension periods is relatively low because: (i) there is little time left to drawn down these credit lines and (ii) the borrower intentionally refrains from taking down full funding so as to avoid being charged higher commitment fees in the next period (Ergungor [2001] ). The funding proportion is likely to increase, however, as borrowers have more time and investment opportunities to draw down (even cumulatively) longer-term irrevocable credit lines.
The exercise-cum-takedown proportion just defined along with the commitment put value is all that we need to compute the bank's capital charge corresponding to the commitment credit risk.
Equations (1) to (10) form the credit-risk valuation programme of loan commitments, which is estimated in the next section.
-SIMULATION RESULTS
-Simulation
As embedded credit-risk derivatives, the put values implicit in extendible and nonextendible commitments alike are but notional values. We thus rely on simulations to compute their values, and our simulation parameters are based on the statistical evidence presented in Exhibit 1. The latter shows that historically the indebtedness value X varies in the value range $96.3 to $103: it is thus sensible to set X at $100, $99.5, $99, $98.5 and $98, for a commitment put that moves progressively in the money 17 . With a line par value of $100, the slightly amounts, (ii) draw downs take place on different dates, (iii) some lines are completely drawn down, others are partially drawn down and in stages, and some are left unexercised altogether, and (iv) banks take advantage of the MAC clause to limit or even cancel funding. 16 Morgan (1993) indicates that between 1988 and 1990, the fraction of the loan limit actually borrowed by prime-rate borrowers is about 55%; unfortunately, he is not reporting the number of commitments left unexercised. 17 To consider values below $98 is of limited interest since there are only three values lower than $98 out of 438 observations. The estimate of the geometric Brownian motion process in eq. (2), dX/X = -0.0000417dt + 0.0079dz(t), indicates a very weak drift with random fluctuations around 0%. -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
in-the-money indebtedness values simulate small increases in the spot markup of the class of floating prime-rate borrowers over the commitment and/or extension periods. Granted these indebtedness values, simulation experiments are performed for one-year non-extendible commitments, P0, and borrower-extendible commitments, EPis, with extension period from one to five years. The time to commitment maturity at valuation date s = 0 is T 1 -s = 0.5 year for the one-year straight commitment and T 2 -s = 1.5, .., 5.5 years for the extendible commitments contracts. In addition, the following parameters are common to all simulations: the credit-line strike price remains constant through time, L 1 = L 2 = $100, the risk-free interest rate, r = 0.04, is consistent with the 4.5% CD rate introduced in subsection 2.1, and ρ = (T 1 /T 2 ) ½ . The indebtednessvalue volatility, σ, computed above is 0.7342 or 2.54% on an annual basis; the simulations are performed with a 3% annualized volatility, namely σ = 0.03.
Before reporting on the simulations, we first clarify the meaning of computed put values.
Consider the very plausible scenario represented by the entries in column (3) of Table 1 , in which the indebtedness value is slightly in the money at X = $99. According to the first boldfaced entry in column (3), the estimate P0 = 0.434 means that the European put embedded in a one-year straight commitment has an equilibrium value of 0.43% of the $100 par value if: (i) the floating prime-rate commitment with a 1.5%-p.a. fixed forward markup is priced when the stochastic markup on spot loans is 2.5% p.a., and (ii) the remaining life of contract is six months. By way of contrast, when the time remaining to commitment expiry is 18 months, the put value of the borrower-extendible commitments in row (1a), column (3) of matrix 1 is $0.733. Put values of longer-term commitments are also computed, with $4.62 corresponding to a commitment with a five-year extension period. The magnitude of the extension premiums comprised in borrower-extendible Parameter definition: L 1 = L 2 : credit line exercise value in $; r = short-term rate of interest, in % per annum; σ = indebtedness-value volatility in % per annum; T 1 = commitment initial maturity date; T 2 = commitment terminal maturity date, with T 2 varying from 2 to 6 years; T 2 -T 1 = extension duration, from 1 to 5 years; T* = loan maturity date; and X = indebtedness value in $ computed from eq. (1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) Common parameter values: L 1 = L 2 = 100; r = 0.04; σ = 0.03; T 1 -s = 0.5; T 2 -s = 1.5, …, 5.5; T 2 -T 1 = 1, …, 5.
commitments is shown in matrix 2. For our reference scenario in column (3) again, the premium is but a moderate 40.8% when the extension duration is one year but much steeper (up to 90.6%) for longer-term extendible commitments.
-Commitment put values and their extension premiums
Two revealing tendencies of commitment put values are emerging from the matrices in Table 1 . The first tendency reveals the magnitude of the notional liability incurred by the bank for carrying unused credit lines at the audit date. The rows and columns of matrix 1 show that commitment put values, and hence commitment credit risks, (i) increase steadily when the indebtedness value is moving progressively deeper in the money, but (ii) increase exponentially when the extension period is growing longer. To wit, in row (1a) for a commitment that offers a one-year extension, the put value decreases from approximately $1.19 for X in the money at $98 to about 34 cents for an at-the-money indebtedness value. The other rows depict similar put-like value curves, which are shown graphically in Figure 1 . By way of contrast, the matrix columns capture the effect of the extension duration on the put values; this corresponds in Figure 1 , for a given indebtedness value, to a move from one value on a lower curve to one on a higher value curve.
More concretely, for X = $98 in column (1), put values are increasing from $1.19 for a straight commitment to $7.57 for a commitment with a 5-year extension period. In brief, matrix 1 and According to entries on row (2a) for instance, the one-year extension premium as a percentage of EP1 declines from 43.5% to 29.4% when the indebtedness values move deeper in the money. This declining pattern is duplicated in each of the other rows of matrix 2, but from a higher starting point. In other terms, the extension premiums implicit in longer-term extendible commitments are percentagewise much larger than those embedded in short-term commitments; yet the declining pattern becomes smoother for longer extension periods.
These simulation results are used in the next two sections to quantify the link between commitment credit risk and its risk-weighted capital charge.
-THE 'FAIR' CAPITAL CHARGE FOR COMMITMENT 'TRUE' CREDIT RISK
The Basle credit risk rules (see BIS [1988] or Santos [2001] ) require that standard risk-adjusted balances be determined for each off-as well as on-balance-sheet instrument and their aggregate value be weighted against a definition of regulatory capital. To calculate risk-adjusted values, off-balance-sheet contractual amounts are initially converted by way of credit-conversion factors to on-balance-sheet "credit-equivalent amounts"; which in turn are weighted by appropriate principal-risk factors to determine "risk-adjusted balances". Since the end of 1992, a minimum total capital requirement of 8% applies to such balances. Regarding offbalance-sheet commitments more specifically, the 1999 Amendments to the Accord do not recognize anymore the commitment original (less than or over one year) term to maturity as the criterion on which to differentiate conversion and risk factors
18 . Yet before implementing the 1999 Amendments in November 2006 (see BIS [1999a BIS [ , 1999b BIS [ , 2000 BIS [ and 2001 ), the BIS is still entertaining proposals regarding how to improve the computation of the capital charge of such off-balance-sheet instruments.
The information regarding commitments is presented in Panel A of Table 2 billion and that of other (mainly corporate) loans is $89.8 billion, and in both cases, the theoretical principal-risk weight is 100% according to line (4). Yet for computation, the actual weight is less than 100% since it is a weighted average of counterparty risk weights within each category. On line (1) also, the aggregate of all commitment contractual amounts, $121 billion, is of the same order of magnitude as the total amount of on-balance-sheet corporate loans, $121.9
billion shown on line (3). But $86.9 billion or 71.8% of all off-balance-sheet commitments is 18 An analysis and critique of the BIS new guidelines can be found, among others, in Andre et al. (2001) , Barrios and Blanco (2003) , Benink and Wihlborg (2002), Fisher (2001) , Hammes and Shapiro (2001) , or Krahnen and Weber (2001) . Notes: a Irrevocable commitments are unused portions of firm authorizations to extend credit and revocable commitments are offers but no obligations to extend credit. b n.a. = not applicable. c The first figure refers to the BIS-set percentage and the second to the actual (after netting out) weighted average of counterparty risk within this class. The latter figure is used to compute line (5).
Source: Royal Bank of Canada, 2002 annual report. For Panel A: Table 25 , p 60 and Note 18, p 91, and for Panel B, Table 27 , p 63. Caveat regarding RBC reporting inconsistency: 40.9 billion in Panel A of < 1-yr irrevocable commitments becomes 44.8 billion in Panel B. Thus 3.9 billion of < 1-yr irrevocable commitments should be globally reallocated to revocable and longer-term irrevocable commitments.
-
deemed riskless according to the BIS accounting-based valuation of commitment credit risk.
Thus, this nil risk-weighted balance along with the extremely large risk-adjusted balance (over 15 billions) for longer-term irrevocable commitments defines but a very coarse credit-risk grid. Table 2 . To wit, the two-year commitment (one-year commitment period + one-year extension period) characterizes commitments with an initial term from 1 to 3 years. b These EPi values are from column (3) in Table 1 , but per one billion of commitment face value. They correspond to our representative scenario in which the indebtedness value is slightly in the money at X = $99.
- Table 2 complements the previous panel. According to this panel, revocable and irrevocable commitments are classified in four time ranges defined on the basis of their initial term to maturity. These ranges are particularly relevant since we intend to differentiate borrower-extendible commitments on the basis of the length of their extension period. The panel inspection reveals that most commitments are irrevocable, except for the majority of the 1-to-3-year commitments, which are of the revocable type. In aggregate, over 80% of all commitments have an initial maturity up to 3 years, and only 13.7 % of them have an initial term to maturity longer than 5 years.
We are now in a position to offer an alternative to the BIS valuation of commitment credit risk. It is based on three premises. Firstly, the use of borrower-extendible commitments allows us to circumvent the BIS dichotomy of revocable and irrevocable commitments, the latter being further split on the basis of only two initial-term-to-maturity. Secondly, the proportion of [off-balance-sheet] commitments that is likely to become [on-balance-sheet] outstanding loans is captured by the exercise-cum-takedown proportion, which dependents on the commitment maturity ranges introduced in Panel B of Table 2 . And thirdly, the commitment credit risk is determined by the put value implicit in borrower-extendible commitments. In other terms, the exercise-cum-takedown proportion and the extendible-commitment put value play the role of the BIS credit-conversion factor and principal-risk factor, respectively. The approach is illustrated in Table 3 , where the benchmark scenario X = $99 from Table 1 is combined with data from Table   2 . As the computation is for illustrative purpose only, we select the mid-point of the time ranges from Panel B of Table 2 ; for instance all 1-to-3-year commitments ( On the first line, the exercise-cum-takedown proportion of 55% converts the off-balance-sheet contractual amount into an on-balance-sheet credit-equivalent amount --also reported on line (3) of Table 3 . The latter result is then multiplied by the European put value (the credit risk embedded in 1-to-3-year extendible commitments) to arrive on the second line at the risk-adjusted balance of short-term commitments --an amount also shown on line (5) of Table 3 . On the third line finally, the capital charge obtains by applying the 8% capital requirement to the just-computed riskweighted balance --this corresponds to line (6) in Table 3 . In Table 3 similarly, the fair capital charge is $7.9 million for straight commitments, $10.0 million for all commitments in the 3-to-5-year maturity range, and 46.0 million for all commitments with maturities over 5 years. It thus appears that the capital charge for commitments with different original term to maturity is usually moderate and internally consistent --all in the order of a couple of millions. This is to be contrasted with the BIS dichotomy of no capital charge for both non-extendible irrevocable commitments and all revocable commitments, and an extremely substantial one (0.08 x $15.6 billion = $1.25 billion) for longer-term irrevocable commitments. We round up this first policy implication by formalizing the option-based procedure just proposed in 
-NEW STANDARD CREDIT RISK WEIGHTS FOR LOAN COMMITMENTS
We next propose that the risk weights applicable to all credit commitments be based on the two previously developed concepts, EPi and π i . The extendible commitment put can be written as
) and the funding proportion as π i = g (d i , I i , T 2 -T 1 ). In the previous developments, most of the parameters of both variables were kept constant, with only two parameters being really variable, X and T 2 -T 1 . Ceteris paribus we can thus determine the sensitivity of EPi with respect to X and T 2 -T 1 , and that of π i in terms of T 2 -T 1 . And the resultant risk-weighting system relies on two not-unreasonable assumptions: (i) the extendible put value is mainly a function of the indebtedness value, the latter being itself a proxy for the borrowers' risk ratings of public credit agencies, and (ii) the funding proportion varies with the length of the extension period.
Firstly, regarding the extendible-put sensitivity to X, we make the following observation:
the floating credit rate and hence forward markup of line commitments are generally set below the credit rate and markup set in spot loans. It is moreover sensible to assume that the differential between spot markup and forward markup grows larger as the borrower's risk rating by external credit agencies declines. In essence, we propose to associate the progressively in-the-money indebtedness values with the declining risk-rating ranges proposed for on-balance-sheet loans in the Secondly, as it was already mentioned in subsection 2.4, the proportion of line funding is likely to be somewhat greater the longer the commitment extension period. Generally speaking, borrowers have more opportunities to draw cumulatively on the credit line if the extension period is longer than one year. The computation of the new risk weights is based on the following scale:
the funding proportion increases progressively from 50% of the initial $100 maximum for oneyear straight commitments to 75% for six-year commitments -namely those with a five-year extension period beyond the initial one-year commitment. Given the above assumptions, the proposed matrix of standard risk weights has the advantage to be a function of three parameters:
the risk-rating ranges of external credit agencies, the length of the extension period, and the variable funding proportion. The granularity of this two-dimensional system is indeed richer (although it could be improved by increasing the number of risk grades in a bank's internal-rating system) than the present BIS coefficients characterized by the superficial time-to-maturity dichotomy for irrevocable commitments and their only two principal-risk factors.
The new risk weights per $100 of borrower's extendible commitment are presented in Table   4 : columns of this time-risk table refer to rating ranges from public credit agencies and rows to the extension-duration-cum-funding proportion 19 . Not unexpectedly, the table rows reveal that, for a commitment with a given extension-cum-funding proportion, the credit-risk weights present a down-sloping put pattern. To wit, for a commitment with a two-year extension period with 60% funding on the matrix fourth row (namely EP2; π 2 = 0.60), the risk weights decline from $1.556 per $100 of commitment for below investment-grade borrowers to $0.517 per $100 of commitment for top investment-grade borrowers. This pattern is also shown on the three-dimensional Figure 2 , where the X base axis (1 to 5) refers to the borrowers' risk bucket, the Y base axis (S1 to S6) to the extension duration-cum-funding proportion, and the vertical axis to the bank's cost of credit risk per $100 of line commitment. But, when a given risk bucket is chosen, the move in Figure 1 from the lowest put-value curve to a higher one corresponds to a longer extension period. More 19 The matrix captures the sensitivity of the extendible put value to the indebtedness value and the extension duration, namely ∂ 2 EPi/∂X∂(T 2 -T 1 ). Each row of the resultant matrix is next multiplied by a different exercise-cum-takedown proportion, π i . Common parameter values: L 1 = L 2 = 100; r = 0.04; σ = 0.03; T 1 -s = 0.5; T 2 -s = 1.5,..., 4.5. Note: a The takedown proportion varies with the length of the extension period, denoted by the π-subscript.
concretely, for top credit borrowers in the matrix fifth column, the risk weights increase exponentially from $0.098 for a one-year straight commitment to $1.801 for a commitment with a five-year extension period. In brief, both Table 4 
-CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research makes two contributions. The first one is to price analytically put option and extension premiums embedded in rollover commitments; and the second is to combine extendible put and the exercise-cum-takedown proportion when computing the 'fair' capital charge corresponding to the commitment 'true' credit risk. In doing so, the procedure proposes to replace the BIS credit-conversion factor, principal-risk factor, and commitment term-to-maturity dichotomy with three market-based concepts. Namely, (i) the borrowerextendible commitment differentiated on the basis of the extension-period duration; (ii) an exercise-cum-takedown proportion, and (iii) the value of the put option embedded in the extendible commitment. The fair-value procedure has the advantage that (i) the put value constitutes a finer credit-risk grid than the two artificial values of the conversion and principal-risk factors, and (ii) capital charges computed from risk-weighted balances are quite moderate and internally consistent for all commitment types. Finally, the paper provides new standard commitment risk weights that account for the borrower's rating ranges of public credit agencies. Further work will consider expressing rollover commitments as multiple shout options, as was done for equity options in Windcliff et al. (2003) . For extendible commitments, shout options have the advantage to allow resetting at the end of each commitment or extension period the indebtedness value equal to the line par value; it also allows accounting for multiple extension fees. Another point to elaborate further is the change of markup class by the bank's borrower: a matrix of transition probability between markup states seems a promising start.
APPENDIX
The payoff of the extension privilege is eq. (7) 
